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Abstract--Recently, network technologies have rapidly developed, and distributed processing sys- 
tems which are of asynchronous and parallel characteristics are very useful in various fields. However, 
it is very difficult o figure out the factors of failure of such systems. In this paper, we make a Petri 
net model of a simple distributed processing system consisting of a main system and a subsystem, 
and show how to diagnose serial failure of the system by analyzing invariant sets of the model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, distributed processing systems have widely propagated in the society and have been 
on an important mission. It has become very important or crucial to affect the society by its 
failure. When a distributed processing system is to be constructed, generally its scale becomes 
very large. It is impossible to assure that the system is always free from failure. And in case 
of failure occurring in a part of the system, it needs to execute effectively the countermeasure 
of failure. Therefore, systematic serviceability of the system is a very important problem to 
maintain high system reliability [1,2]. With conventional methods, Fault Tree [3] has been used 
to show systematic failure of the systems. But the framework of Fault Tree is based mainly on 
analysis in hardware aspects, together with experience of failure analysts. Fault Tree can show 
systematic failure of comparatively simple systems, but it is hard to detect failure of complex 
systems uch as distributed processing systems. 
In this paper, we consider a distributed processing system [2] with asynchronous mode and 
model it by using a Petri net [4,5]. Since it is not enough to understand failure only from hardware 
aspects, we derive the invariant sets of the Petri net model in order to clarify the failure from 
the system functional aspects. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of a Petri net model, and 
develops the Petri net model of a distributed processing system. In Section 3, an invariant set of 
the Petri net model is introduced as an effective method for clarifying the structural properties of 
the system. In Section 4, invariant analysis with T-invariant is applied to conduct serial failure 
diagnosis of the system. Finally, Section 5 concludes the work. 
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2. PETRI  NET  MODEL 
In this section, we briefly introduce a Petri net and develop a Petri net model for a distributed 
processing system. 
A Petri net is an abstract and formal graph model useful for modeling systems that exhibit 
concurrent, asynchronous or nondeterministic behavior. Recall the composition of a Petri net 
by a bipartite graph [4,5]: a set of places, P (drawn as circles), representing conditions, a set of 
transitions, T (drawn as boxes), representing events, and a set of arcs, A, which connect places 
to transitions or transitions to places. Places may contain tokens (drawn as small filled circles) 
denoting the conditions holding at any given time. The state of a Petri net, called the marking, 
is defined by the number of tokens contained in each place. 
A place is referred to as an input place of a transition if an arc exists from the place to the 
transition; a place is referred to as an output place of a transition if an arc exists from the 
transition to the place. A transition is enabled when each of its input places contains at least one 
token. Enabled transitions can fire, by removing one token from each input place and depositing 
one token in each output place. As an event is usually enabled by a combination of conditions, 
a transition is enabled by a combination of tokens in places. Arcs are used to signify which 
combination of conditions must hold for the event to occur and which combination of conditions 
holds after the event occurs. Thus, the firing of a transition causes a change of state (produces 
a different marking) for the Petri net model. 
A Petri net N may be defined as a four-tuple. 
N = (P,T,A, Mo), (1) 
where 
is the set of places. 
P={p i l l  < i<]P I}  (2) 
Pl: The 
P2: The 
P3: The 
P4: The 
Ps: The 
P6: The 
p~: The 
subsystem is doing local processing. 
subsystem is shifting with the main system. 
main system is doing on-line processing. 
main system is shifting with the subsystem. 
subsystem fails and stays in failure state. 
system stays in trap state. 
subsystem is being repaired. 
T={t j l I< j< IT I}  (3) 
is the set of transitions. A is the set of directed arcs, and M0 is the initial marking. 
In this paper, we present a Petri net model of a typical distributed processing system with 
possible task shift between the main system and subsystem. 
Figure 1 shows the configuration of a distributed processing system. The main system is 
mainly doing on-line processing tasks and the subsystem is mainly doing local processing tasks. 
When some conditions are met, the roles of the two systems are exchanged without affecting 
the function of the system. Figure 2 shows the procedure of failure analysis of the distributed 
processing system. While the subsystem is doing local processing, it is possible that there will 
be system failure due to communication error, and the subsystem is recovered by the function 
of the main system. But, if communication error occurs, during shift between the main system 
and subsystem, both systems may stop and become trap state (or system failure state). In case 
the subsystem fails by independent failure, it restarts after being repaired. In case the system 
becomes failure state or trap state, it is recovered by recovering function. Figure 3 shows the 
Petri net model of the distributed processing system. The places Pi (i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  12) and the 
transitions tj (j -- 1 ,2 , . . . ,  14) in Figure 3 are given the following interpretations: 
main system 
subsystem 
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Figure 1. Configuration ofa distributed processing system. 
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Figure 2. Procedure of failure analysis of a distributed processing system. 
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Figure 3. Petri net model of a distributed processing system. 
Ps: The main system is doing local processing. 
Pg: The main system fails and stays in failure state. 
Plo: The system stays in failure state. 
P11: The main system is being repaired. 
P12: The system is being repaired. 
tl: The main system shifts from on-line processing to local processing and the subsystem 
shifts from local processing to on-line processing. Shifting between the main system and 
subsystem starts. 
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t2: Shifting between the main system and subsystem finishes and the main system returns to 
on-line processing; the subsystem returns to local processing. 
t3: The subsystem experiences system failure due to communication error. 
t4: The subsystem is recovered by the main system. 
ts: While the main system and subsystem are exchanging their roles, communication error 
occurs and the system becomes trap state. 
t6: The subsystem fails and the main system executes as a proxy for the subsystem. 
$7: Subsystem failure cannot be recovered by the main system. 
t8: The main system fails and becomes failure state. 
tg: Subsystem repair finishes and both the systems return to routine processes. 
tl0: Main system repair starts. 
tu :  Main system repair finishes. 
t12: Subsystem repair finishes and the system restarts. 
t13: System recovery from trap state starts. 
t14: The system recovery from trap state finishes. 
3. INVARIANT ANALYS IS  
The Petri net invariant set is well known as an effective method to clarify the structural 
properties of a Petri net model. Generally and practically, P-invariant and T-invaxiant are 
widely used. P-invariant is a set of places in which the total number of tokens stays the same 
under any reachable marking of the net. It is used to confirm the safety of the model. On the 
other hand, T-invariant is defined as a set of fired transitions in the firing sequence that takes the 
model back to the start marking. It shows the possibility of regeneration of a certain marking of 
the model. 
To execute failure diagnosis of the system effectively, it is not enough to just investigate hard- 
ware aspects. It is necessary to investigate systematic failure by considering system functional 
aspects. P-invariant of a Petri net can confirm the safety for the system, but it cannot be used 
to obtain functional flow of the system. On the other hand, T-invariant of a Petri net is corre- 
sponding to the events which occur in the system, so it can grasp systematic failure, together 
with the system functional aspects. In this section, we apply T-invariant analysis to our model 
of the distributed processing system. 
T-invariant of the Petri net is defined by the following equation: 
N T • Y = o. (4) 
Here, the incidence matrix for a Petri net with n transitions and m places 
N = (N (tj,p~)) (5) 
is defined as follows: 
1 i fp ieO(t j ) ,  P i• I ( t j ) ,  
N(tj ,pi)= -1 i fpiEI(t3),  p i~O(t j ) ,  
0 otherwise. 
N T is the transpose of the incidence matrix N. 
Next, let Y be a solution of the system of equations where each element of y is either 0 or 1 
and y cannot be obtained additively from other solutions. The set of transitions corresponding 
to the nonzero elements of y is referred to as a T-invariant set. The incident matrix N of the 
Petri net in Figure 3 is given by the following expression: 
N = 
- -1  1 -1  
1 -1  1 
-1  0 0 
1 0 0 
0 -1  0 
-1  0 -1  
0 0 0 
0 0 -1  
1 0 1 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
1 0 1 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
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1 0 0 0 0 
-1  0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 -1  0 0 0 
-1  0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 -1  -1  
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 -1  -1  
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 -1  0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
The T-invariant sets of the net model are obtained as follows. 
0 0 0 0- 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
-1  0 1 0 
0 0 -1  0 
0 -1  0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 -1 .  
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Y1 = [00000001011000] T, (6) 
Y2 = [00000100100000] T, (7) 
Y3 = [00000n0000100] T, (8) 
Y4 = [11001000000011] T, (9) 
Y5 = [00110000000000] m (10) 
FA ILURE D IAGNOSIS  4. SERIAL 
Regarding the T-invariant sets as failure sequences of the system, we get the sequences corre- 
sponding to the four types of failure shown in Figure 4. 
(a) (b) 
~14 
(c) (d) 
Figure 4. Failure sequence for the Petri net model in Figure 3. (a) Failure sequence 
for the main system. (b) Failure sequence for the main system and subsystem. (c) 
Failure sequence for trap for the system. (d) Failure sequence for the subsystem. 
(1) Figure 4a presents the failure sequence from the main system. It is represented by the 
sequence of T-invariant Yl(t8,  tlo, tn}  shown in expression (6). This sequence presents a
failure countermeasure s quence in which the main system fails, the system becomes failure 
state, and the main system is repaired. That  is, repair of the main system may be executed 
in the sequence of fired transitions {ts, tlo, tn}.  
(2) Figure 4b presents a failure sequence for both the main system and subsystem. Transi- 
tion t6 is the common transition among T-invariant Y2{t0, tg} shown in expression (7) and 
T-invariant Y3{to,tv, t12} shown in expression (8). Transition t~ interprets the root event 
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between T-invariant Y2 and T-invariant Y3. Briefly, this sequence has two types of failure. 
First, the subsystem fails and then the main system executes local process as a proxy for 
the subsystem. Second, this sequence is a failure sequence of both the main system and 
subsystem, in which main system function cannot recover the subsystem's failure and the 
system fails, the subsystem's repair finishes, and the system restarts. Therefore, Figure 4b 
is not enough to understand as a failure sequence of hardware for the system, and it needs 
to execute functional countermeasure for the system. 
(3) Figure 4c presents trap failure sequence for the system and is represented by T-invariant 
Y4{t l , t2 , t s , t l3 , t l4} .  While shifting between the main system and subsystem, because 
of communication error occurring, the system becomes trap state. Briefly, this sequence 
presents trap countermeasure for the system repair. 
(4) Figure 4d presents a failure sequence of the subsystem and is represented by T-invariant Y5 
(t3,t4}. Briefly, this sequence presents a subsystem failure sequence in which subsystem 
fails due to communication error and the subsystem is recovered by main system function. 
As mentioned above, in order to clarify serial failure for the system, it is not enough to investi- 
gate only hardware aspects. However, T-invariant sets of the Petri net model as described in this 
section allow us to grasp serial failure based on dynamic and functional aspects of the system. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a Petri net model of a simple distributed processing system 
and a method for executing effectively serviceability and diagnosis for the system. 
The defect of conventional Fault Tree analysis was mainly on analysis for the hardware, together 
with relying on experience of the failure fact analyst for the framework of Fault Tree. However, 
it is impossible to clarify serial failure of the system in order to construct he system associated 
with generating complex procedure between the elements. With the method presented in this 
paper, it is possible to model the system with asynchronous and parallel motion by using a Petri 
net, and to execute ffectively serviceability and diagnosis for the system by showing serial failure 
fact that considers ystem function, for it is not enough to consider only hardware aspects. 
Although a distributed processing system taken up in this paper is a small scaled system, it may 
infer serial failure fact for the system from the Petri net model. But, if a more detailed model of a 
more realistic system is constructed, the method shown in this paper may be considered efficient 
to understand graphical procedure of serviceability and diagnosis for the system, grasping serial 
failure fact for the system by using a Petri net model and considering both system function and 
failure countermeasure. 
For the future issues, it will be necessary to try to apply the method in this paper to more 
complex systems, in which procedures and mutual relation of multiple units are more complex. 
Moreover, since the method can grasp seriously the functional relation of elements in the system, 
it is interesting to apply it to the analysis of sequence of coordination motion of an autonomous 
distributed system in which elements (or modules) determine their own actions by autonomously 
coordinating among themselves to accomplish the goal. 
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